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The Preservation of Diversity Jurisdiction for National Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
Where is a national bank located? Common sense suggests the
response that a bank is located where it maintains physical presence.
However, taking this common definition and incorporating it into
federal court diversity jurisdiction law has negative implications on
parties seeking to gain access to federal court where no federal question
exists.
Federal court diversity jurisdiction is premised on the notion
that federal courts provide litigants with an arena free from state and
local biases.2 If there is no question of federal law, a litigant may access
federal court only by means of the diversity statute, which provides that
federal courts will have jurisdiction over any civil suit involving citizens
of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 3
Citizenship of corporations is determined by statute.4 For the purposes
of the diversity statute, a corporation "shall... be deemed a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it
has its principal place of business...,, However, national banks are not
treated as corporations and have a special citizenship statute.6 The
national bank citizenship statute (hereinafter "citizenship statute") was
enacted as part of the same legislation as the diversity jurisdiction
statute, and supplements § 1332 by deeming that national banks7 are
citizens of "the States in which they are respectively located."8
1. See discussion supra Part V.
2. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (enacted in 1948 and amended in 1958 to add the
definition of corporation citizenship).
4. Id.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) (emphasis added).
7. "National Banks are instrumentalities or agencies of the federal government created
in accordance with the National Banks Act." 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks and Financial
Institutions § 13 (1997).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) (emphasis added).
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However, the meaning of the term "located" in the citizenship statute
caused a split among circuits. 9
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory language of
28 U.S.C. § 1348,10 the citizenship statute, in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Schmidt" will have a profound effect on the ability of national banks
that operate in more than one state to access federal court and will
prevent national banks from being in a position adverse to that of their
state chartered counterparts. 2 In Wachovia, the Fourth Circuit, with
one dissent, held that national banks are "located" in every state in
which they operate a branch office.' 3 The citizenship statute has been
interpreted in the past, and the Fourth Circuit's opinion was new and
different from other interpretations of the citizenship statute.' 4  For
example, the dissent in Wachovia, the Seventh Circuit, and the Fifth
Circuit have all interpreted the term "located" to include only one or
two places.' 5 On appeal of the Wachovia case to the United States
Supreme Court, Wachovia and the United States, as amicus curiae,
argued that "located" as used in the citizenship statute includes only a
national bank's main office, or one place.' 6 Likewise, common sense
would construe citizenship as encompassing but one location. 7
9. See, e.g., Horton v. Bank One, N.A. 387 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
term "located" did not extend to states in which banks operate a branch); Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a national bank is located in
each state in which it operates a branch for diversity jurisdiction purposes), rev'd, No. 04-
1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006); Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a national bank is "located" where it operates its principal place of
business and in the state listed on its organization certificate).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No. 04-1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2006).
12. See Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Schmidt, No. 04-1186, 2006 WL 89196, at *3 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 2006) ("Held: A national bank, for § 1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in
which its main office, as set forth in its articles of incorporation, is located .... Were we to
hold, as the Court of Appeals [the Fourth Circuit] did, that a national bank is additionally a
citizen of every State in which it has established a branch, the access of a federally chartered
bank to a federal forum would be drastically curtailed in comparison to the access afforded
stated banks and other state-incorporated entities. Congress, we are satisfied, created no
such anomaly."); See also discussion infra Part V.B.
13. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004). A bank branch is
defined as a place "at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." The term
"branch" does not include ATMs. 12 U.S.C. § 360) (2000).
14. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 9 accompanying text.
16. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Wachovia, No. 04-1186. Justice Stevens raises
a textual argument noting that the use of the word "respectively" in the citizenship statute
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In Wachovia,18 a South Carolina citizen filed a complaint
against Wachovia Bank in South Carolina state court.' 9 Wachovia, a
national bank, incorporated and headquartered in North Carolina,
petitioned the United States District Court in South Carolina on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (hereinafter
"diversity statute") to compel arbitration of the matter.20  The petition
was denied, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the matter for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Wachovia operates branches
in South Carolina and is therefore a citizen of South Carolina,
destroying diversity.21
Wachovia successfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, and argued that Wachovia can have but one location
under the citizenship statute, North Carolina.22 The Supreme Court
leads to the conclusion that the citizenship statute is referring to many national banks that
are "respectively citizens - of different States." Id. He argues that because the statute says
banks should "be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located,"
Congress is addressing multiple national banking associations but only one location for each
association and that the word "States" is plural not because it is referring to more than one
state but because it is referring to more than one national banking association. Id.
Furthermore, Justice Stevens points out that typically, a citizen is a citizen of only one place
and that to overcome this presumption with regards to corporations, Congress amended the
diversity statute to make corporations citizens of two places. Id. He goes on to note that
Congress has failed to add language to the citizenship statute to overcome this same
presumption with regards to national banks. Id. at 38-40 & 47-48.
17. See id. at 44. ("we normally don't think that entities are citizens of multiple
states.... People aren't citizens of-of 50 states. I mean, that -that's an extraordinary
result to reach.").
18. In the original action, Respondent, Schmidt, alleged civil conspiracy, fraud,
constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, South Carolina Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and
abetting against Petitioner, Wachovia Bank, N.A. Brief in Opposition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 5, 7, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005)
(No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006). These claims have not been
settled as Wachovia filed an action to compel arbitration on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction and under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. Other defendants in the original
action have filed similar actions to compel arbitration in South Carolina State Court and
such motions have been denied. Id. Wachovia's motion to compel arbitration was denied by
the district court on August 1, 2003. Id. Wachovia appealed, and the Fourth Circuit found
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of lack of diversity and
dismissed the case. Id. Interestingly enough, Schmidt won on the merits in the district
court and argued that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Wachovia, 388 F.3d at 415.
19. Wachovia, 388 F.3d at 416.
20. Id.
21. Id. at432.
22. Brief of Petitioner, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, (4th Cir. Aug.
15, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
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heard oral arguments on November 28, 2005.23 On January 17, 2006,
the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
citizenship statute, as that interpretation was contrary to the common
sense understanding that a citizen can be a citizen of only one place and
contrary to congressional intent because it would place national banks
in a position adverse to that of their state chartered counterparts by
severely limiting their access to federal court on diversity grounds; the
Court held that national banks are deemed citizens of the state in which
they operate their main office as set forth in their article of
incorporation.24
This Note will examine both the rationale and implications of
the interpretation of the word "located" as used in the citizenship
statute. More specifically, Part II will describe the conflicting
interpretations of the term "located" as used in that statute.25 Part III
will analyze the intent of Congress with respect to a national bank's
ability to access federal court and how the holding in Wachovia could
have undercut this intent.26 Part IV will consider the role of the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency in interpreting the jurisdiction
27statute. Lastly, Part V will address the possible implications of the
Wachovia holding by the Fourth Circuit on national banks and the
potential disparate treatment between national banks and state banks
and between national banks and non-banks.28
II. THE MEANING OF "LOCA TED"
The Fourth Circuit's dismissal of Wachovia effectively turned
on the meaning of the term "located" as used in the citizenship statute.2 9
The statute fails to define the term and because of this, courts are to "...
construe [the] statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning., 30 "Location" is defined by the most recent edition of Black's
23. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 1, Wachovia, No. 04-1186.
24. Wachovia, 2006 WL 89196, at *1; see supra note 16; see also discussion infra Part
III.
25. See infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 107-164 and accompanying text.
29. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414,415 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No. 04-
1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
30. Id. at 416 (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,476 (1994)).
136 [Vol. 10
0 NATIONAL BANKS
Law Dictionary as "[t]he specific place or position of a person or a
thing.",3' The Fourth Circuit in Wachovia used this definition as a basis
for holding that the word "located" signifies physical presence.32 An
amicus brief submitted by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.33 interprets this
same definition to mean that a location is limited to a specified number
of places, and that the term should not extend to physical presence.34
Furthermore, JPMorgan relies on MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T Co.,35 to point out that the dictionaries in existence at the time of
the statute's enactment are the most relevant in determining the
meaning of an undefined or ambiguous word used in a statute.36 Section
1348 was enacted in 1948; in 1951, Black's Law Dictionary made a
reference to banks in its "location" definition.37 The 1951 dictionary
stated "[a] bank is 'located' in the place specified in its organization
certificate., 38 The possibility of disagreement as to even the "ordinary
and natural use" of the term led the federal circuit courts to split as to
the meaning of "located" and whether it included states in which a
national bank operates a branch.39
The Circuit Courts that have considered the issue have used
varying methods in order to arrive at their respective interpretations, but
each method begins with the plain language of the statute.4 ° Section
1348, the citizenship statute, reads
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced by the United States, or by
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (8th ed. 2004).
32. Wachovia, 388 F.3d at 416-17.
33. On November 13, 2004, JPMorgan Chase Bank changed its New York state charter
to a national charter. Bank One, J.P. Morgan Merge Charters, DAYTON Bus. JOuRNAL, Nov.
15, 2004, http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2004/l 1/15/daily4.html. As a result of
this charter switch, JPMorgan has much at stake in the interpretation of the national bank
diversity jurisdiction statute. See id.
34. Brief Amicus Curiae of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in Support of Petitioner at 8-
11, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186),
rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
35. 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (finding that the most relevant time to determine the
meaning of a statute is the time of the statute's enactment).
36. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 34, at 5.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 7 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1088 (4th ed. 1951)).
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977), infra note 43.
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the direction of any officer thereof, against any national
banking association, any civil action to wind up the
affairs of any such association, and any action by a
banking association established in the district for which
the court is held....
All national banking associations shall, for the purposes
of all other actions by or against them, be deemed
citizens of the States in which they are respectively
located.41
The major argument amongst the circuits revolved around
whether the use of the terms "established" and "located" should be
given different meanings within the same statute, and if the two words
must be given a different meaning, national banks are precluded from
claiming that they are only citizens of their state of incorporation, that
is, where they are established.42
One canon of statutory interpretation is that different words in
the same statute should be given different meanings.43 The Fourth
Circuit relied on this canon to apply the interpretation of the national
bank venue statute in Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Bougas
44
to the present case. The Fourth Circuit justified using the interpretation
of the national bank venue statute in Bougas to interpret the national
bank jurisdiction statute at issue on the notion that the jurisdiction and
venue statutes should be treated as in pari materia.45 In Bougas, the
Supreme Court held that the use of both "established" and "located" in
the venue statute expressed Congress' intent to assign them different
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) (emphasis added).
42. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
43. Cunningham v. Scibana, 259 F.3d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (where words were
similar but not the same, the court recognized Congress's deliberate intent to use different
words to assign them different meanings).
44. 434 U.S. 35 (1977).
45. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No.
04-1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006). In pari materia refers to a canon of
construction in which statutes relating to the same subject matter can be interpreted the same
way so that inconsistencies in one can address inconsistencies of the other. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004). The Supreme Court rejected this argument stating that
"venue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the same order." Wachovia, 2006
WL 89196, at *7 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
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meanings and because of this, "established" refers to the place at which
a bank was chartered, and "located" must refer to "any place where it
operates and maintains a branch doing general banking business. 46 The
Fourth Circuit adopted this view and held that a national bank had two
types of presence; one is that of physical presence, such as operating a
branch, and the other is the place where a national bank is chartered.47
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's holding in Wachovia, the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits rejected this argument on multiple grounds.48 In
Horton v. Bank One, N.A., the Fifth Circuit relied on what it called a
"longstanding interpretation" that the location of a national bank did not
include branches.49 One of these "longstanding interpretations" was by
the Seventh Circuit in Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul.5° In Firstar, the court
ruled that the Bougas case was at most minimally applicable to the
interpretation of the citizenship statute because venue and jurisdiction
are not the same issue and therefore not in pari materia.51 The Firstar
Court also held that the terms "located" and "established" could be
assigned distinct meanings in order to follow the statutory interpretation
canon without a finding that national banks are "located" in each state
where they operate a branch.52 "Established" connotes the state noted
on a bank's charter while "located" refers to the bank's principal place
of business.53 Both the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit agree that a
national bank is "located" where it operates its principal place of
business and in the state listed on its charter or organization certificate.54
In addition, the Supreme Court in Marquette Nat'l Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,55 found that "the mere
46. Bougas, 434 U.S. at 40, 46. Although Bougas settled the meaning of the term
"located" in the national bank venue statue, the Supreme Court left open the issue of the
statutory meaning of that term in the jurisdiction statute at issue in Wachovia. In the case at
issue, Justice Ginsburg writing for a unanimous court found that "Congress' use of two
terms may be best explained as a coincidence of statutory codification." Wachovia, 2006
WL 89196, at *7 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
47. Wachovia, 388 F.3d at 419.
48. See infra notes 49-54.
49. Horton v. Bank One, N.A. 387 F.3d 426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2004).
50. 253 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2001).
51. Id. at 990.
52. Id. at 992.
53. Id.
54. Horton, 387 F.3d 426 at 436 (5th Cir. 2004); Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d
982, 994 (7th Cir. 2001).
55. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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fact that a national bank 'transacts business'.. . in a [S]tate other than
that of its 'organization certificate' . . . does not suffice to locate the
bank in the foreign [S]tate for purposes of venue under the National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94." 56 This holding seemed to narrow the
meaning of "located" within that statute as interpreted by Bougas. 7
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. History
Wachovia argued that the intent of Congress was not to limit the
national banks' access to federal court. 58  Therefore, Wachovia
contended, upholding the Wachovia decision would defeat
congressional intent by destroying the ability of national banks to
remove cases to federal court in the majority of states.5 9
In the beginning, a national bank's ability to remove cases to
federal court was sweeping.6 ° In 1863, Congress enacted the National
Currency Act under which federal courts had original jurisdiction over
any actions involving a national bank regardless of citizenship or
federal question; this provided national banks with an automatic
pathway to federal court.6' In 1882, however, the predecessor to the
citizenship statute was enacted and governed jurisdiction over national
banks.6 2 That statute did away with automatic access to federal court as
56. Id. at 314 n 25. The statute dealing with national bank venue provides that "[a]ny
action or proceeding against a national banking association.., shall be brought in the
district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which that
association's principal place of business is located, or, in the event any State, county, or
municipal court has jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, in such court in the
county or city in which that association's principal place of business is located." 12 U.S.C. §
94 (2000).
57. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 61-92 and accompanying text.
59. If Wachovia v. Schmidt is upheld, Wachovia Bank, being a national bank, would
have access to federal court jurisdiction in thirty-five of fifty-one potential jurisdiction as
opposed to forty-nine or fifty jurisdictions if the Supreme Court rejects the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of located in Wachovia. Brief of American Bankers Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner Wachovia Bank, N.A., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388
F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2006).
60. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
61. The National Currency Act, ch. 58, § 59, 12 Stat. 665, 681 (1863) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
62. Law of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163, repealed by ch. 346, § 39, 62
2006] NATIONAL BANKS
provided by the National Bank Act, effectively giving national banks
the same access to federal court as allowed to state banks.
63  The
"located" language was added to the national bank jurisdiction statute in
1887.64 "Located" was interpreted in 1892 in Petri v. Commercial
National Bank of Chicago,65 and the United States Supreme Court found
that "[n]o reason is perceived why [we] should [hold] that [C]ongress
intended that national banks should not resort to federal tribunals as
other corporations and individual citizens might.,
66 As the language of
the historical citizenship statute became more similar to the modem day
citizenship statute, and as courts continued to interpret the language,
there appeared to be no intent to limit the national banks' access to
federal court.67
In 1943, in American Surety Co. v. Bank of California,
68 the
Ninth Circuit held that a bank is "located" in the state where it
maintains its principal place of business.
69  Five years later, the
citizenship statute was enacted in its current form and preserved the
exact language that was interpreted by the court in American Surety.
70
"[11f a phrase or section of a law is clarified through judicial
construction, and the law is amended, but retains the same phrase or
section, then Congress presumably intended for the language in the new
Stat. 992 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)).
the jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association
established under any law providing for national-banking associations,
except suits between them and the United States, or its officers or
agents, shall be the same as, and not other than the jurisdiction for suits
by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States
which do or might do banking business where such national-banking
associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun: And
all laws and parts of laws of the United States inconsistent with this
proviso be, and the same are hereby, repealed.
63. Id.
64. Law of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 Stat. 552, 554-55 (1887) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)) ("That all national banks... for the purposes of all actions by or
against them... be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located
.... '1).
65. 142 U.S. 644 (1892).
66. Id. at 650-51.
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68. 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943).
69. Id. at 162.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) ("National banking associations, shall, for the
purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the states in which
they are respectively located.").
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law to have the same meaning as the old."'" Thus, had Congress
intended to expand the meaning of "located" in the jurisdiction statute,
the rationale is that they would have done so subsequent to American
Surety and prior to the enactment of the current national bank
jurisdiction statute.72
B. The Parity Argument
The Law of July 12, 1882, 7a established parity between state and
national banks with regards to diversity jurisdiction.74 According to the
amicus brief of the United States in Wachovia, the purpose of this
statute was "to put national banks on the same footing as the banks of
the state where they were located for all the purposes of the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States. 75  Because state banks are not
governed by the citizenship statute for diversity jurisdiction purposes
their citizenship is determined like corporations under the diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.76 As a result, state banks are considered
citizens of the state in which they are chartered and the state in which
they maintain their principal place of business. 77  The notion is, as
adopted by the Supreme Court, that national banks should not be treated
in a disparate manner under the holding of the Fourth Circuit, which
71. Brief of American Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Wachovia Bank, N.A. at 15, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug.
18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006) (citing Brangdon v.
Abbot, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
74. Law of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163, repealed by ch. 346, § 39, 62
Stat. 992 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)).
75. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20 (quoting
Leather Mfrs. Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887)), Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 2006).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) ("All national banking associations shall, for the
purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which
they are respectively located.") (emphasis added).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). It is important to note that state banks also have interstate
branches. For example, SunTrust Banks, Inc., a state bank headquartered in Atlanta, GA,
has branches in Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. SunTrust Banks, Inc., About SunTrust,
http://www.suntrust.com (follow "More" hyperlink under "About Suntrust") (last visited
Jan. 28, 2006).
provides that national banks are "located" in each state in which they
operate a branch.78
As noted above, the addition of the "located" language as used
today was not interpreted to limit national banks' access to federal
court.79 For this reason alone, entities with an interest in preserving
national bank diversity jurisdiction argued that parity between state
chartered banks and nationally chartered banks has survived the
amendments to the diversity statutes.8"
C. Section 1348 Did Not Anticipate Interstate Branching
The argument that it is consistent with congressional intent that
national banks have access to federal court in the same way that state
banks have access to federal court is furthered by the recognition that at
the time the citizenship statute was enacted, there was very little
interstate branching for national banks, and it was therefore almost
impossible for national banks to be "located" in more 
than one state.8'
The McFadden Act afforded national banks the first opportunity to
establish branches in 1927, but they were limited to operating branches
in the cities in which the national banks operated their principal place of
business, and then only if state banks were permitted to do the same.
82
The McFadden Act was amended in 1933 to permit national banks to
establish branches within the state in which their principal office was
78. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, No. 04-1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2006) (holding national banks are citizens of the state listed in their article of incorporation);
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No. 04-1186, 2006
WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
79. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Brief for Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 14, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005)
(No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-26, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d
414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
81. See Brief for the Petitioner at note 15, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d
414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
Although national bank interstate branching was not expressly allowed until the passage of
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, a 1959
amendment to the National Banking Act allowed national banks to move their main offices
thirty miles and made no mention of state lines. This allowed interstate branching in some
limited circumstances. Id.
82. The McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (2000 & Supp. 2002)).
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located, but still did not provide them with the opportunity to create
interstate branches. 83 It was not until June 1, 1997 that national banks
were permitted to operate interstate branches.84
It does not seem possible that Congress intended for the term
"located" to include states in which national banks operated a branch
when interstate branches were not in use at the time the citizenship
statute was enacted. 5 The language in the citizenship statute has
remained identical to that of its original 1948 form, which was codified
at a time when national bank interstate branching was non-existent;86
what follows is the simple fact that "located" could not have included
branches at the time the statute was enacted. Chief Justice Roberts
stated at oral argument that "Congress could have dealt with [the spread
of national banks] by enacting something that dealt with the
proliferation of branch banks rather than interpreting the 1948 statute in
light of the 1980's. '' 88 However, Congress has not done this, and
Wachovia argued that Congress "saw no need" to do so in light of the
interpretations that gave the citizenship statute its original meaning and
maintained parity between state and national banks.88
Furthermore, the citizenship statute was enacted at the same
time as the diversity statute in its original form.89 In its original form,
the diversity statute did not include the language relating to
corporations; this language was added in 1958.90 As noted earlier, the
citizenship statute was intended only to supplement the diversity
jurisdiction statute, notably at a time when there were few interstate
83. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90 (1933) (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000 & Supp. 2002)).
84. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12
U.S.C. § 36 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 70, 81 and accompanying text. "When Congress enacted § 1348's
statutory predecessors and then § 1348 itself, a national bank was almost always "located"
only in the State in which it was "established," under any of the proffered definitions of the
two word, for, with rare exceptions, a national bank could not operate a branch outside its
home State." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, No. 04-1186, 2006 WL 89196, at *7 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 2006).
87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 53, Wachovia, No. 04-1186.
88. Id.
89. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 20, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d




branches.9 With the addition of the language describing the citizenship
of corporations, the citizenship statute should be considered
unnecessary.92
IV. THE ROLE OF THE OCC IN INTERPRETING § 1348
In an interpretive letter, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) stated that
a national bank is a citizen of the state in which its
principal place of business is located and of the state that
was originally designated in its organization certificate
and articles of association, or if applicable, the state to
which that designation has been changed under other
authority (i.e., the state in which its main office is
currently located).93
In this letter, the OCC for all intents and purposes adopted the holding
of the Seventh Circuit in Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul with the only
change being the instructions for dealing with the movement of a "main
office. 94
There is a question about what weight should be given to this
interpretation because in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDA, Inc.,
95 the
Supreme Court held that when a court reviews an administrative
agency's construction of the statute that it administers, there are two
questions.96 The first is whether or not Congress has spoken to the issue
91. See supra note 81 and text accompanying note 10.
92. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Ltr. No. 952 (Oct. 23, 2002),
12 USC 21-23, 12 USC 30B (February 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov
/interp/feb03/int952.pdf. ("If the Fourth Circuit's interpretation in this case is adopted, and
a bank is "located" for jurisdictional purposes 'wherever it has physical presence,' then
diversity is largely destroyed for national banks with multiple branches (and possibly even
ATMs and processing centers as well, under the Fourth Circuit's broad language).").
94. Id. at 5 ("We believe the interpretation of the statute and fundamental reasoning of
the Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul court are correct."). In the same letter, the OCC recognized
the possibility that a bank will change the location of the main office that was listed on the
organization certificate as a result of a merger or some other reason and because of this
noted that a bank is a citizen of the state listed in its articles of association which reflect
these changes. Id.
95. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
96. Id. at 842.
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at hand, and the second is whether the agency's regulation addressing
the statute at issue is a "permissible construction of the statute." 9 The
Court further held that "a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of the agency."98  This deference principle has been
applied in interpreting banking statutes in light of OCC regulations.99
Applying Chevron deference to the case at hand poses at least two
problems. First, the OCC is not charged with enforcing the federal
jurisdiction statute. '00 Second, even if it was, the OCC has not issued a
regulation on point; instead they have issued an interpretive letter which
sets out its position with regards to the statute. 0 1 In determining what
deference must be given to agency interpretations that fall short of
regulations, the Supreme Court held that United States Customs Service
"classification rulings are best treated like 'interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.' They
are beyond the Chevron pale."' 2 This holding distinguished those
interpretations from regulations promulgated with a lawmaking intent
by not affording them Chevron deference.0 3
The role of the OCC in Wachovia was therefore likely no more
than another voice. 10 4  However, although interpretations may not
qualify for Chevron deference, that does not mean that they do not
qualify for any deference whatsoever. 05 "Chevron did nothing to
eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit
some deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and
broader investigations and information' available to the agency, and
97. See id. at 842-43.
98. Id. at 844.
99. See, e.g., Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251 (1995) (relying on Chevron to hold that an OCC regulation allowing a national bank to
sell annuities should be give considerable deference as it was a reasonable interpretation of a
statute for which the OCC was charged with administering).
100. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Wachovia, No. 04-1186.
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (U.S. 2001) (quoting Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
105. Mead, 533 U.S. at 220 (2001).
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given the value and uniformity in its administrative and judicial
understandings of what national law requires.
' 106
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Destruction of Parity with State Banks and The Decline in
Access to Federal Court
If the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding that
a national bank is "located" in every state where it operates a branch,
the parity between national banks and state banks created by the 1882
amendment to the National Banking Act would have been destroyed.
0 7
The citizenship statute applies only to national banks, therefore, only
national banks would be considered citizens in every state where they
operate a branch. 0 8 The most extensive national bank branch network
is in thirty states. 09 Under the Fourth Circuit's holding in Wachovia,
these banks would be able to gain access to federal court through
diversity in only twenty-one of the available fifty-one jurisdictions
because diversity would be destroyed if sued by a citizen of any of the
thirty states in which they operate."0 A state bank, on the other hand,
would continue to have access to federal court by virtue of diversity
jurisdiction in forty-nine or fifty of the available jurisdictions. This
disparate treatment cuts directly against the congressional intent to place
national banks on "equal footing" with state banks."'
106. Id. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). "The
weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoughtfulness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
107. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
109. Bank of America, N.A. operates 5,958 branches in thirty states. See Brief of
American Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner Wachovia Bank,
N.A. at Appendix A, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18,
2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
110. See also supra note 59.
111. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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B. State Bank Advantages
Limiting the ability of national banks to access federal courts
without doing so for state banks would likely put state banks at a slight
competitive advantage."12  For one, "[b]ankers fear that state courts
favor local plaintiffs and are not friendly to large, national
organizations."1 3 Such local bias is what the diversity statute set out to
quell" 4 and can potentially lead to unfavorable rulings for an out-of-
state national bank forced to litigate in state court while a similarly
situated out-of-state bank could litigate its claims against a state's
citizen in federal court. Because state banks would have the option of
litigating in federal court, they could be subject to more sympathetic
interpretations and verdicts." 5  In discussing an act that would force
class-action lawsuits to be heard in federal court, Gary S. Caplan, a
financial services partner at Sachnoff & Weaver, stated that "'[t]he
sponsors [of the act] believe that state courts are too prone to large
verdicts and don't have tight controls on awards and damages, and
perhaps even let suits carry on and sustain a life of their own... It's
more of a known commodity in federal courts. State courts are often a
crapshoot."'' 6 Diane Casey-Landry, president and CEO of America's
Community Bankers recognizes that the higher costs resulting from
large settlements would lead to increased costs for consumers in the
form of higher fees and lower dividends for shareholders.' Logic
dictates that consumers will be less drawn to national banks if they are
unable to match the lower fees of state banks due to large state court
judgments."18  A loss of consumers would be detrimental to national
banks as many of their assets are attributable to loans to consumers, and
a large portion of a banks' income comes from interest earned on these
loans. 9
112. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
113. Ethan Zindler, Top Court to Hear Two Big Cases for Industry, AM. BANKER 1, Sept.
2, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14151759.
114. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
116. Karen Krebsbach, What WouldAll the Lawyers Do?, U.S. BANKER, Mar. 1, 2005, at
20, available at 2005 WLNR 3098738.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
119. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 317 (2nd ed., 2004).
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Historically, Congress has tried to ensure that national banks
will not be at a competitive disadvantage to state banks. 120 Courts have
also recognized this intent.1 21 "In 1969, [the Supreme Court] reiterated
that the McFadden Act 'reflects the congressional concern that neither
system [state or national] have advantages over the other in the use of
branch banking. ' ' ' 12 It necessarily follows that in order to maintain
equality between state and national banks, national banks must have
equal access to federal court.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage
Both state and national banks are uninhibited in their ability to
switch from a state to national charter and visa versa.1 23  As a result,
banks often adjust their charters as needed to take advantage of the most
favorable regulations. 24 Had the Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth
Circuit and held that national banks are "located" in every state in
which they maintain a branch, the disadvantage that national banks
would be facing could have caused some national banks to switch
charters. 125 Switching to state charters would allow these national banks
to maintain access to federal court in all states except those in which the
bank is chartered and in which the bank operates its principal place of
business. 26 Of course, many other factors would weigh into a national
bank's decision to switch charter; banks typically switch charters to
gain more powers, reduce regulatory cost, form a more favorable
relationship with their principal regulator, or in order to expand
120. See, e.g., The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90 (1933)
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000 & Supp. 2002)). (in further response to state
branching, national banks were permitted to establish intrastate branches to the same extent
that state banks were permitted to do so); The McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224,
1228 (1927) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000 & Supp. 2002)) (in response to state
bank branching, the Act allowed national banks to create branches within the municipality
of their main office to the extent that state banks were permitted to do so).
121. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
122. Brief for Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
9 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969)), Wachovia Bank, N.A.
v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196
(U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
123. Broome & Markham, supra note 119, at 76-77.
124. Id.
125. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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nationwide.127 But it is possible that the economic effect of state court
settlements 128 would have been considered an indirect cost to be
factored into a decision to switch charters.
29
D. Non-Bank Advantages
"Non-banks" are entities closely related to banks but treated
differently than banks in terms of regulation because they do not fall
under the traditional definition of a "bank."'"3 Therefore, "non-banks"
are not subject to the citizenship statute and are governed by the same
diversity statute as state banks and other corporations.13' In addition to
the destruction of parity between national banks and state banks, there
was a potential disparity between the ability of national banks to invoke
diversity jurisdiction and the ability of other corporations such as
insurance brokers and other financial companies, two types of
companies that compete with banks, to do so.' This result would have
been anomalous, because even though those non-bank corporations
have a "physical" presence in many states just like banks, they are only
considered citizens of a maximum of two states.1
33
127. Richard J. Rosen, Switching Primary Federal Regulators: Is It Beneficial for U.S.
Banks?, available at http://www.chicagofed.org (follow "Economic Research & Data"
hyperlink; then follow "Economic Perspectives" hyperlink; then scroll down to "3rd
Quarter.").
128. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. For the purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act, banks are defined as any of
the following: "(A) An insured bank as defined [by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act]. (B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States, the
District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, or the Virgin islands which both (i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the
depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others;
and (ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2000
& Supp. 2002). The statute also prescribes exceptions for which institutions will be
considered "non-banks" and therefore not subject to the restrictions of the Bank Holding
Company Act. Id.
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
132. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
133. Brief for Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
3, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186),
rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006). "A corporation can have only one principal
place of business for purposes of establishing its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, since
the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1332] used the word 'the,' rather than 'a,' in referring to the
corporation's 'principal place of business' as one of the tests of citizenship. This is true
even when a corporation has a complex structure and conducts business in several states."
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Banks in general are already seeing a decline in their ability to
attract commercial and industrial borrowers due to the increased number
of restrictions they face that "non-banks" do not. 134 In order to maintain
presence in the financial services field, national banks must remain
competitive with state banks and non-banks.135 Larger judgments that
will result from state court litigation would further inhibit this ability.136
E. Federal Thrifts and Diversity Jurisdiction
National banks are not the only entities to whom the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt was of concern,
the citizenship of federal thrifts is also inconclusive. 137  Because 28
U.S.C § 1348 applies only to national banks, the citizenship of federal
thrifts is not defined, and as a result, courts have found that thrifts are
not a citizen of any state. 138 This decision with regards to thrifts is
perplexing to say the least, and it will be interesting to see whether or
not Congress addresses this gap in the wake of the Wachovia
decision.
139
In an interpretative letter, the chief counsel of the Office of
Thrift Supervision stated that "[w]e continue to be of the view that the
fact that the Association's home office is located in the state from
which interest rates will be exported provides, by itself, a sufficient
nexus between the loan and the home office state, regardless of any
activities that may occur in a branch state."' 4 °  For the purposes of
exportation federal savings associations are considered located in the
32A AM. JUR. Federal Courts § 801 (1997).
134. See Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the
Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783, 785 (1995) (discussing nonbank competition facing banks).
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
137. Testimony of Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency Before the Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the U.S. Senate at note 7, June 21, 2005.
138. Id.
139. "[T]he case [Wachovia v. Schmidt] might prove to be problematic later because it
does not carve out the same federal protections for national thrifts that it does for national
banks." Damian Paletta, High Court Rules for Wachovia in Venue Case, AM. BANKER 1,
January 18, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1308367.
140. Office of Thrift Supervision, Interpretive Ltr. P-2004-8, (Sept. 17, 2004) http://
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/560407.pdf (interpreting the location and exportation authority of
federal savings associations under the Home Owners' Loan Act).
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home office state. 14' This interpretation, if eventually incorporated into
a diversity jurisdiction statute, is more in line with the "location" of
corporations under the diversity jurisdiction statute than the
interpretation of the same in the Fourth Circuit's decision.
F. How Far Will it Go?
Another consideration of the possible adoption of the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation is the likely practical effect that it would have
had.142  Not only did the Fourth Circuit hold that "located" included
states in which a national bank operates a branch, but it also found that
"located" is functionally equivalent to "physical presence."' 143 In light
of the growth of the banking industry and the expansion of the use of
internet banking, this language potentially opened the door to require
national banks to be citizens of states in which they do not operate a
branch at all.' 44 It is possible to imagine a scenario in which a citizen of
State A banks electronically with a national bank only located in State
B, and the question becomes whether or not the national bank is now
"physically present" in State A because its services are available there.
However, the more far reaching implication is that it is also possible to
construe this language to include ATMs 145 and loan production offices,
offices that generate loans but do not take deposits. 146 In 2004, Bank of
America, N.A. had ATMs located in forty-five states. 147  In one
141. Id.
142. "[W]hy in the world would Congress have wanted to impose the - the system that
follows from - from you result in which the - the national banks are - are excluded from
diversity jurisdiction to a degree that the State banks clearly are not?.. .we try to avoid
freakish results, and this seems like a freakish result." Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-
35, Wachovia, No. 04-1186.
143. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414,417 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No. 04-
1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
144. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Wachovia, No. 04-1186 (Justice Roberts
and Justice Breyer questioned whether a broad reading of "located" would extend to
ATM's, messengers, and warehouses).
145. Brief Amicus Curiae of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in Support of Petitioner at 2,
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug., 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186),
rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 24-25, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
146. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Wachovia, No. 04-1186 ("[B]ut what about
where it has an office that's not a branch? What about where it stores - where it has
warehouses that store its [the bank's] records?").
147. Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at 24.
152 [Vol. 10
NATIONAL BANKS
instance, the Supreme Court held that an armored car service could be
considered a branch under the National Banking Act.148 Being mobile,
an armored car could potentially be "located" in all fifty-one
jurisdictions meaning that the particular national bank that owned the
car would never be able to access federal court on diversity grounds.
49
The obvious implication of this consideration is a further decrease in the
potential access of national banks to federal court.'5°
G. Impact on Pending Cases
The Fourth Circuit remanded Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt
for dismissal based upon lack of jurisdiction.' 5' If the Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, the decision would not only have
had a prospective effect on the access to federal court but will also have
retroactively affected suits well on their way to resolution.'52
Affirmation would have required all cases involving national banks
pending in federal court on the basis of diversity be dismissed or
remanded if diversity is destroyed because the national bank operates a
branch in the state in which its adversary is a citizen.'53 This would
have resulted in a loss of time and resources for many litigants.'5 4 For
example, from January 2001 until August 2005, Wachovia Bank alone,
the fourth largest bank in asset size as of June 30, 2005,' was a party
in 105 appellate cases and 575 civil cases in federal district court."'
This would not only have been inefficient for national banks and
148. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (U.S. 1969).
149. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
151. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, No. 04-
1186, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006). Note that an objection to subject matter
jurisdiction can be made at any time and is not waived if a motion is not made or if a
responsive pleading is filed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12.
152. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
153. Brief of American Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Wachovia Bank, N.A. at 15, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. Aug.
18, 2005) (No. 04-1186), rev'd, 2006 WL 89196 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
154. Id.
155. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Data Guide, Top 100 Banks and
Thrifts Nationally by Asset Size, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/guide/ (last visited
Nov. 2, 2005).
156. Brief for American Bankers Association, supra note 153, at 19 and note 13 (data
was obtained from the U.S. Party/Case Index on PACER, which is a national tracker for
federal court activity).
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individual litigants, but inefficient for state courts as it would set into
motion "case dumping" from the federal to state level.
15 7
H. Inconsistency in Decisions
Many who fight to maintain diversity jurisdiction in its broadest
form argue that national commercial transactions are made possible by
the federal court's uniformity. 58 If national banks were forced to litigate
most claims in state courts, each applying the state's own procedural
and substantive law, the results may have been wholly unpredictable
and inconsistent. 19 For one, the "value of cases involving state-law
claims may well be increased,"'' 60 especially where local bias influences
a judgment. 161 This takes away from the predictability that is integral to
operations as a nationwide entity and to policy development of national
banks. 162  State banks, thrifts, and other corporations, such as "non-
banks,"163on the other hand, would not be plagued by this inconsistency
as their ability to remove to federal court would remain intact.'64
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Fourth Circuit's holding may have followed
common sense in that a bank is "located" in each state where it operates
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 292 (Erwin Chemerinsky, ed., 4th ed.
2003).
159. See Lyle Washowich, National Banks Beware: Your Branches May Carry Greater
Risk that You Realize, 122 BANKING L.J. 699, 702-03 (2005). One specific inconsistency
will potentially occur in the enforceability of waivers of class-wide arbitration. Federal
courts have found that such waivers do not violate the Truth in Lending Act, citing a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp.-
Alabama, 244 F.3d 814, 818 (lth Cir. 2001). On the contrary, some state courts have
found such waivers to be unconscionable. See Szetala v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr.2d
862 (Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003).
160. See Washowich, supra note 159, at 702-03.
161. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
162. See Washowich, supra note 159, at 702-03. ("The impact of the split [among
circuits as to the meaning of "located" in § 1348] is three-fold: (1) it removes a strategic
option in defending a matter in the circuits which adopt the Wachovia Bank rationale; (2)
the value of cases involving state-law claims may well be increased; and (3) the way policy
is made affecting national banks could shift in an important way.").
163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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a branch, that interpretation departed from application of the law in the
way Congress intended.
165
The Supreme Court ruling in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt
will have a profound effect on the national banking industry in that it
will not force national banks to file suit or be sued in the courts of states
in which they maintain a branch. 166 If the Court had affirmed Wachovia
and held that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1348, the citizenship
statute, the term "located" includes each state in which a national bank
operates a branch, national banks would have been severely restricted in
their ability to gain access to federal courts which would put them at a
competitive disadvantage to state banks, thrifts, and other
corporations. 167  This holding would have had many implications,
including running counter to congressional intent by producing
disparate treatment between state and national banks. 68 Such a decision
would have also affected cases pending in federal court whether at the
district or appellate level.169 However, "[n]ational banks won a major
legal victory Tuesday, [January 17, 2006,] as the U.S. Supreme Court
made it harder for them to be sued in state courts.' 170 Another obvious
positive effect was reconciling the differences in interpretation amongst
circuits. 7'
The Court could not uphold the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Wachovia because no policy reason justified the disparate treatment and
the negative impact it would have on national banks. "Treating national
banks differently [from corporations and state banks].. . imposes
extraordinary restrictions on their access to federal courts [and] runs
directly counter to a more than century-old federal policy dictating that
national banks not be disadvantaged vis-A-vis their state chartered
counterparts.' ' 72 Regardless of the favorable holding for national banks,
it "does not supplant the need for a uniform rule that would apply to
165. See discussion supra Part III.
166. See discussion supra Part V.
167. See discussion supra Part V.B & Part V.D-E.
168. See discussion supra Part V.
169. See discussion supra Part V.G.
170. Damian Paletta, High Court Rules for Wachovia in Venue Case, AM. BANKER 1,
Jan. 18, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1308367.
171. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
172. Marcia Coyle, Finding Out Where Banks Are 'Citizens, 'THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, Dec. 8, 2005, http://www.law.com.
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national banks and federal thrifts to ensure that all [f]ederally chartered
depository institutions are treated in the same manner with respect to
access to Federal court in diversity cases."
'1 73
The Supreme Court's decision that national banks are citizens of
the state located on their articles of incorporation for the purposes of the
citizenship statute is very advantageous to national banks. At oral
argument, Justice Ginsburg stated the entire issue concisely: "Why
would Congress want to give the... State banks greater access to
Federal courts than it gives [to] national banks? What earthly reason
would there be for Congress wanting to do that?"'174 National banks
asked the same question, and the Supreme Court answered.
MICHELLE E. O'LEARY
173. Testimony of Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency Before the Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the U.S. Senate at 10-11, June 21, 2005.
174. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Wachovia, No. 04.1186.
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